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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the drivers and the size of the shadow economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. It also investigates the tax losses associated with these shadow economic activities in all three
countries. The Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model is applied and uses time series
data covering the period 1990–2019. The key findings show that the sizes of the shadow economies of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are 10.44, 11.18 and 20.47% respectively. The results also show that
the average size of the shadow economies between 1990–2019 was 14.92% in the Czech Republic, 18.72% in
Hungary and 22.85% in Poland. The Czech Republic loses 3.13% of tax revenue from goods and services
and 2.83% from incomes and profits as a result of the shadow economy, while Hungary loses 5.05% of tax
revenue from goods and services and 1.68% from incomes and profits. Poland loses 5.25% of tax revenue
from goods and services and 4.34% from incomes and profits.
KEYWORDS




The term underground or shadow economy largely refers to activities in a country which involve
the production of goods and services that are not covered in the official system. These activities
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are experienced in all economies across the world but the share of such activities as a percentage
of official GDP differs from country to country. Though their presence is largely seen as bad,
they make positive contributions to the economies in which they are found in the form of
income and alternative source of employment to a section of the labour force. The negative
consequences of underground economies are the huge losses of government revenues and vi-
olations of labour, health and safety regulations (OECD 2017). Shadow economies also
contribute to various forms of distortions in the labour market.
The definition of shadow economy includes all economic activities which are hidden from
the authorities for monetary, regulatory, and institutional reasons. Monetary reasons include
avoiding payment of taxes and all social security contributions. Regulatory reasons include
avoiding governmental bureaucracy or the burden of regulatory procedures. Institutional rea-
sons include corruption, the quality of political institutions and weak rule of law. For this study,
shadow economies reflect mostly legal economic and productive activities that, if recorded,
would contribute to national GDP. Therefore, the definition of shadow economy in this study
tries to avoid illegal or criminal activities, do-it-yourself, or other household activities. Many
definitions focus on the hidden nature of output and employment (see Gerxhani 2003; Hassan –
Schneider 2016; Schneider – Williams 2013).
Empirical research into the size and development of the global shadow economy has grown
rapidly over the years (Feld – Schneider 2010; Schneider 2015, 2017; Williams – Schneider, 2016;
Hassan – Schneider 2016). Shadow economies by nature are difficult to measure, as agents
engaging in shadow economic activities try to remain undetected. This study focuses on the
cases of three Visegrad countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The Visegrad group
is a cultural and political alliance of four Central European countries: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. All four countries are member states of the European Union
(EU). Slovakia is excluded due to data challenges on key variables. The need for information
about the extent of the shadow economies and their developments over time in the three
Visegrad countries is motivated by the topic’s political and economic relevance. Moreover, total
economic activity including official and unofficial production of goods and services is essential
in the design of economic policies that respond to fluctuations and economic development over
time and across space. Furthermore, the size of the shadow economy is a core input to estimate
the extent of tax evasion and thus for decisions on its adequate control.
The paper therefore seeks to shed light on the extent of shadow economic activities in the
three mentioned Visegrad countries. This includes an estimation of the size of the shadow
economies as a percentage of official GDP, a determination of the factors that contribute to the
growth of such activities and an assessment of the tax losses associated with these shadow
economic activities.
The study applies the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model as explained
by Schneider (2016). In this model, the size of the shadow economy is represented by a latent
variable, with its causes called observed variables and indicators called measurement variables.
The latent variable is used in a system of two equations, as the dependent variable with its causes
and as the explanatory variable for the indicator variables. The equations are estimated
simultaneously, and the fitted values of the latent variable are used to compute an estimate of the
size of the shadow economy as a share of GDP.
The study considers variables such as corruption, the rate of unemployment, low GDP per
capita, high tax burdens, higher social security contributions, poor business regulations,
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complicated and bureaucratic business registration procedures, self-employment activities,
among others, as the determinants of the shadow economies in the three Visegrad countries.
The presence of a shadow economy is indicated by the following variables: high cash outside the
banking system, low labour force participation in the official system and high GDP growth. The
study covers a period between 1990 and 2019 and applies time series data obtained from the
World Bank Country Indicators.
The structure of the study is as follows: following this introduction, the second section deals
with the review of literature on the study of shadow economies and methods applied. The third
section focuses on the methodology of the paper, and also specifies the data, data sources and
data transformation techniques. The fourth section shows the interpretation and discussion of
the results, while the final section focuses on drawing conclusions to the key findings of the
paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Visegrad Group is made up of four Central European countries that have relations in the
area of business, and other economic activities. The history of the Visegrad Group is traced back
to the 14th century. The four countries in this group are commonly referred to as the V4. The
current population of the three countries covered in this paper is estimated to be 10.6 million in
the case of the Czech Republic, 9.7 million people for Hungary and 37.9 million for Poland. The
rate of taxes on goods and services is about 21% in the Czech Republic, 27% in Hungary and
23% in Poland. Corporate taxes or taxes on incomes and profits of companies is about 19% in
the Czech Republic, 9% in Hungary and 19% in Poland. The rate of unemployment is about 2%
in the Czech Republic, 3.4% in Hungary and 3.3% in Poland according to the World Devel-
opment Indicators (2019). Real GDP per capita in the Czech Republic is about US$17,620,
Hungary US$12,560 and Poland US$12,430 (World Development Indicators 2019). The labour
force participation rate in the official economy is about 60% in the Czech Republic and 56% in
both Hungary and Poland according. The percentage of self-employment is about 16, 10 and
20% in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland respectively. The Czech Republic has a better
index for start-up procedures for business registration (9), than Hungary (7) and Poland (5).
These differences may affect the dynamics of the shadow economies in the respective countries,
and are reviewed in this section.
Shadow economic activities are activities and incomes earned through ways that circumvent
government regulation, taxation or observation. More narrowly, the definition of shadow
economies includes monetary and non-monetary transactions of a legal nature. This captures all
productive economic activities that would generally be taxable when reported to the tax au-
thorities. Such activities are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid payment of
income taxes, value added or other taxes and social security contributions, or to avoid
compliance with certain legal labour market standards such as minimum wages, maximum
working hours, or safety standards and administrative procedures. The shadow economy thus,
focuses on productive economic activities that would normally be included in national accounts,
but which remain underground due to tax or regulatory burdens. Although such legal activities
would contribute to a country’s value added, they are not captured in national accounts.
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The size of the shadow economy in each country depends on various elements. Literature
highlights specific causes and indicators of shadow economies. According Enste (2018), shadow
economies in Central and Eastern European countries are caused by incompetent regulatory
institutions, weak regulations and bureaucratic business registration procedures. Enste (2010)
focused on institutional determinants of shadow economies stating that the quality and quantity
of governmental regulation are the most important factors determining the size of the shadow
economy. Studies that found regulatory burdens as a common cause of shadow economies of
countries include Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) and Oviedo et al. (2009).
High tax burden is also another notable cause of growth in the size of shadow economies of
countries. Studies that attribute the presence of shadow economies to high tax burdens include
Tafenau et al. (2010), Schneider and Williams (2013) as well as Hassan and Schneider (2016).
Other studies, including De Gijbel (1984), Lemieux et al. (1994) and Enste (2003), associate the
growth of shadow economies with high early retirement ages. They suggest that the reduction of
the working hours for retired individuals drives employees to devote some time to work in the
informal sector.
In most studies, low GDP per capita is mentioned as one of the common causes of shadow
economies (Alanon – Gomez-Antonio 2005; Herwartz et al. 2015; Petersen et al. 2010; Putnins –
Sauka 2011; Schneider et al. 2010; Thiesen 2003). They concluded that low GDP per capita is a
high motivating factor that encourages individuals and businesses to participate in shadow
economies.
Feld and Schneider (2010) and Schneider and Williams (2013) attribute the increasing
presence of shadow economic activities to growing self-employment. Similarly, Bordignon and
Zanardi (1997) concluded that a high self-employment rate leads to a parallel shadow economy
increase insofar as these workers can collaborate with their customers to avoid indirect taxes.
They found that it is easier for large firms to employ irregular workers because they have fewer
internal and external audit control.
The quality of governance has also been associated with shadow economies. Quality of
governance minimizes the growth of shadow economies and vice versa ceteris paribus. Examples
of studies that focused on this factor include Johanson et al. (1998), Dreher and Schneider
(2009), Dreher et al. (2009), Buehn and Schneider (2012), Teobaldelli (2011), Amendola and
Dell’Anno (2010) and Schneider and Williams (2013). Studies by Alm and Gomez (2008),
Stiglitz et al. (2010), and Torgler and Schneider (2009) considered sociocultural dimensions of
society in the estimation of shadow economies. Further studies that captured the impact of
sociocultural factors include Tsakumis et al. (2007) and Petrakis (2014).
3. METHODOLOGY
This study employs the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes model. The goal of the study is
threefold: first to determine the factors that cause shadow economic activities in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland; second, to estimate the size of the shadow economies as a
percentage of official GDP; and third, to assess the extent of tax revenue losses associated with
the shadow economic activities. Various methods have been employed to study shadow econ-
omies of countries. The two common methods are the MIMIC approach (Schneider – Enste
2000; Buehn – Schneider 2012) and the Currency Demand Approach (Ariyo – Bekoe 2011; Faal
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2003). The study uses shadow economy, hidden economy and informal economy inter-
changeably.
As a variant of Simultaneous Equation Models, the MIMIC model has two parts: the
structural equation part and the measurement part. The structural equation part estimates the
relationship between the causal variables and the latent variable (the shadow economy). The
measurement part estimates the relationship between the shadow economy (latent variable) and
the indicator variables. The structural equation model is presented in Eq. (1). In this model, ht is
the latent variable (the shadow economy) and a1;a2; . . . ;a7 are the model coefficients. Symbols
X1;X2; . . . ;X7 denote exogenous causal variables determining the size of the latent variable.
These variables include GDP per capita (measured in constant US$), taxes on goods and services
(%), taxes on incomes and profits (%), time required for business registration, unemployment
rate (%), self-employment (%) and social security contributions (US$). The latent variable is
directly unobserved, but it can be estimated from the MIMIC model. Statistically significant
coefficients imply that the variables are the determinants of the shadow economy.
ht ¼ a1X1t þ a2X2t þ a3X3t þ a4X4t þ a5X5t þ a6X6t þ a7X7t þ «t (1)
Simultaneously, the measurement model estimates the statistical significance of the indicator
variables of the shadow economy. These variables include the labour force participation rate (%)
in the official system, money outside the banking system (US$) and the GDP growth rate (%). If
the estimated relationship is significant at the 5% significance level, it confirms the reliability of
the variables as indicators of the presence of the shadow economy. The measurement model is
given by Eq. (2).
yt ¼ bht þ «t (2)
where yt ¼ ðy1; y2 . . . ; ynÞ is a ð13nÞ vector of the indicator variables, b represents the
regression coefficients and «t is a ð13nÞ vector of errors satisfying white noise.
First, for each country, the MIMIC model is specified, and its parameters are subsequently
estimated by the method of Maximum Likelihood (ML). The ML technique is commonly used
because it provides the estimates of models simultaneously (see Kline 2011; Chou – Bentler
1995). For example, given fX1;X2; . . . ;Xng, a random sample is derived from multivariate
normal distribution Nðm0;
P
0Þ to obtain Σ0 ¼
Pðq0Þ, assumed there is population matrix
function with Σ0; q31 size and q0 is an unknown parameter. The ML function can be defined as
in Eq. (3).
FMLðqÞ ¼ logjΣðqÞj þ tr

SΣðqÞ−1 logjSj  p (3)
The sample covariance matrix is denoted by S and the covariance matrix of the hypothesised
model is represented by Σ(q0), the trace matrix is represented by tr and p denotes the number of
variables (Lee 2007). The data used is annual time series thus, the study performs unit root test
to determine whether variables are stationary or not using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(Dickey – Fuller 1979). The test results show that variables are stationary only after first order
differences. All variables are therefore differenced. The general structure of the MIMIC model is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Equation (4) shows the estimation of the MIMIC index. bht represents the calculated MIMIC
index at a given time t; it is the estimate of the shadow economy as a percentage of the official
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economy. ~ht is the estimated value of the latent variable at time t. ~h1990 is the estimate of the
shadow economy in the base year 1990 and h*1990 is the exogenous estimate of the shadow
economy in 1990. Exogenous shadow economy is the exterior estimate, i.e. base value of the
shadow economies in 1990, derived for each country as the average size of the shadow economy
from several previous studies. The exogenous shadow economy values for ~h1990 for the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland are 18.4, 24.4 and 27.2% respectively (see Schneider et al. 2010).
The cause and indicator variables provided may slightly differ among models for specific
countries.
bht ¼ 100 ~ht~h1990h

1990 (4)
The study also estimates the size of tax losses as a percentage of GDP in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. The estimation begins with the average size of the shadow economies of
the three countries for the period 1990–2019. Given the estimation of the average sizes of the
shadow economies, the study finds GDP of the shadow economy. GDP of the shadow economy
is calculated as a multiplication of the shadow economy index by official GDP. The average tax
rates on goods and services and on incomes and profits are then applied on the GDP of the
shadow economy to determine the amount of tax revenue losses.
During the diagnostic stage, the study verifies parameter significance (a ¼ 0:05) and ensures
that the estimates from the structural equations model and the measurement model meet the
criteria of good fit (StataCorp 2015). In this regard, the results of the MIMIC model are verified
using certain key set of test statistics: standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), the root
mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI) and the co-
efficient of determination (CD). The SRMR is an index of the average of standardized residuals
between the observed and the hypothesised covariance matrices (Chen 2007). SRMR is
Fig. 1. Structure of the MIMIC model
Source: Nchor and Adamec (2015).
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interpreted as the indicator of good fit when the value it produces is lower than 0.05 (Kline 2011;
Lacobucci 2010). RMSEA measures the difference between the covariance matrix of every degree
of freedom and the hypothesised covariance matrix. RMSEA indicates a good fit when the value
it produces lies between 0.05 and 0.08. The fit is neither good or bad when the value lies between
0.08 and 0.10. According to Hu and Bentler (1999), RMSEA smaller than 0.06 will suffice for
good model fit. CFI, which is also used to measure model fit, is an incremental fit index. It shows
the degree to which the main model is superior to the alternative model which is established
with manifest covariance matrix (Chen 2007). CFI produces values which range from 0 to 1.
Higher values indicate good fit (Schermelleh-Engel – Moosbrugger 2003). Estimation of the
MIMIC model and the follow-up diagnostics were completed with STATA 15. The annual time
series analysed in this study were taken from the World Bank country indicators.
4. RESULTS
This section interprets and discusses the findings of the study. The results include the structural
equation models and the measurement models. Significant indicator variables show the exact
Table 1. MIMIC model for the Czech Republic
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P > z
Structural
L1
GDP per Capita 1 (constr.)
Social Security Contributions 0.90 0.41 0.03
Unemployment 0.24 0.07 0.00




Constant 0.39 0.10 0.00
LFPR
L1 0.343 0.012 0.00
Constant 0.64 0.59 0.28
Money
L1 0.61 0.27 0.00
Constant 1.34 0.80 0.10
Note: L1 represents the latent variable (shadow economy).
Source: author.
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factors causing shadow economic activities in the respective countries. Significant measurement
variables show the exact factors used to measure the presence of shadow economic activities.
4.1. The determinants of the shadow economies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland
Table 1 shows the results for the Czech Republic. It shows that shadow economic activities are
caused by GDP per capita, social security contributions, the rate of unemployment and the rate
of self-employment activities. The relationship between GDP per capita and the shadow
economy is negative, indicating that lower GDP per capita leads to higher shadow economic
activities. The result for social security contributions also shows a positive impact, meaning that
the higher the burden of social security contributions, the higher the shadow economy. Un-
employment has a positive relationship with the shadow economy, showing that higher rates of
unemployment push people into shadow economic activities. The relationship between self-
employment and the shadow economy is also positive, implying that higher unemployment
leads to higher shadow economic activities.
Table 2. MIMIC model for Hungary
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P > z
Structural
L1
GDP per Capita 1 (constr.)
Indirect taxes 0.61 0.21 0.00
Corporate taxes 0.19 0.08 0.02




Constant 3.05 0.97 0.00
LFPR1
L1 0.51 0.12 0.00
Constant 0.12 0.21 0.55
Money
L1 0.47 0.15 0.00
Constant 0.01 0.14 0.92
Note: L1 represents the latent variable (shadow economy).
Source: author.
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The MIMIC model results of Hungary are shown in Table 2. It reveals that shadow economic
activities are caused by GDP per capita, taxes on goods and services, corporate taxes (taxes on
incomes and profits) and unemployment. GDP per capita has a negative relationship with the
shadow economy, indicating that lower GDP per capita causes people to venture into shadow
economic activities. The results also show that the burden of taxes both on goods and services
and on company profits causes a rise in shadow economic activities. The final determinant of
shadow economic activities is the unemployment rate, which shows that a higher rate of un-
employment leads to higher rates of shadow economic activities.
The MIMIC model results of Poland are shown in Table 3. The results show that activities of
the shadow economy are caused by GDP per capita, start-up procedures to register a business
(SPRTB), taxes on goods and services, corporate taxes and the unemployment rate. The resulting
signs of the coefficients show that lower GDP per capita causes higher shadow economic ac-
tivities than in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It also shows that more complicated and
Table 3. MIMIC model for Poland
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P > z
Structural
L1
GDP per Capita 0.01
SPTRB 0.51 0.19 0.01
Indirect taxes 1.00
Corporate taxes 0.12 0.09 0.02





Constant 4.07 0.36 0.00
LFPR
L1 1.06 0.52 0.04
Constant 58.19 1.21 0.00
Money
L1 1.00
Constant 0.76 0.28 <0.01
Note: SPTRB represents start-up procedures to register a business, L1 represents the latent variable (shadow
economy).
Source: author.
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bureaucratic procedures for business registration (SPRTB) lead to higher shadow economic
activities. Tax burden is seen to have a positive impact on shadow economies. A positive
relationship is established for both taxes on goods and services as well as corporate taxes. The
unemployment rate has a positive relationship with the shadow economy, indicating that higher
unemployment causes higher shadow economic activities.
4.2. Goodness of fit statistics
The MIMIC model verification for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland show that the
estimated coefficients meet the criteria for interpretation. The estimated model fit statistics are
shown in Table 4. The study measures the quality of the model using values of the RMSEA,
SRMR, CFI and the CD. The SRMR values obtained for all countries are lower than 0.05, thus
indicating a good fit. Using the RMSEA, the values for all countries are less than 0.06, thus also
indicating good model fit. The CFI values for all countries are 1, indicating good fits. CD
measures the percentage of the model explained by the explanatory variables. In the case of the




















Note: Pclose refers to the probability of RMSEA ≤0.05.
Source: author.
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Czech Republic, the CD is 0.55 showing that the model variables explain 55% of the shadow
economy. The value is 0.74 in the case of Hungary showing that 74% of the variation in the
shadow economy is explained by the variables. The coefficient of determination for Poland is
0.57 showing that 57% of the variation in the shadow economy of Poland is explained by the
model variables.
4.3. The estimated size of the shadow economies as a percentage of GDP
Fig. 2 shows the sizes of the shadow economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as a
percentage of official GDP. The shadow economies are smaller in the Czech Republic and
Hungary than in Poland. The size of the shadow economy of the Czech Republic was 10.44% of
official GDP in 2019, 11.18% in Hungary and 20.47% in Poland. The size of the shadow
economies of all countries have declined relatively overtime. The global financial crises affected
the shadow economy of the Czech Republic largely, as its shadow economy reached its peak in
that year, then declined afterwards.
Fig. 3 shows the visualisation of the average size of the shadow economies covering the
period 1990–2019. It shows that even though the 2019 values of the shadow economies are much
lower (10.44% for the Czech Republic, 11.18% for Hungary and 20.47% for Poland), the average
for the entire period is higher (14.92% for the Czech Republic, 18.72% for Hungary and 22.85%
for Poland), largely influenced by the higher initial shadow economy figures recorded for all
countries.
4.4. Average tax revenue losses from shadow economic activities
Fig. 4 shows tax revenue losses as a percentage of official GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. Two types of tax revenues are considered. The first is the revenue generated from
taxes on goods and services and the second is the revenue from taxes on incomes and profits of
companies (corporate taxes). The Czech Republic loses 3.13% of tax revenues from goods and
Fig. 2. The size of the shadow economies in 2019
Source: author.
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services and 2.83% from company incomes and profits. Hungary loses 5.05% of tax revenues
from goods and services as well as 1.68% from incomes and profits. Poland loses 5.25% of tax
revenues from goods and services and 4.34% from company incomes and profits. All figures are
a percentage of official GDP.
4.5. Discussion
This study observes that the determinants of shadow economic activities in the three Visegrad
countries are related. In other words, there are common causes to a large extent, even though
Fig. 4. Tax losses from the shadow economy
Source: author.
Fig. 3. The average size of the shadow economies from 1990 to 2019
Source: author.
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one or two factors vary. The study finds that GDP per capita, burdens of social security con-
tributions, unemployment and self-employment activities are the causes of the shadow economy
of the Czech Republic. The study also finds that GDP per capita, taxes on goods and services,
taxes on incomes and profits (corporate tax) as well as the rate of unemployment are the de-
terminants of the shadow economy of Hungary. In the case of Poland, the study observes that
GDP per capita, start-up procedures to register a business, taxes on goods and services, taxes on
incomes and profits, self-employment as well as the unemployment rate cause shadow economic
activities. The study observes that GDP per capita and the rate of unemployment are common
causes of the shadow economies in all three Visegrad countries.
The findings show a negative relationship between GDP per capita and shadow economy in
all three countries, indicating that lower GDP per capita leads to higher shadow economic
activities and vice versa ceteris paribus. The result for social security contributions shows a
positive impact meaning that the higher the burden of social security contributions, the higher
the motivation to participate in the shadow economy. Taxes on goods and services are seen to
also have a positive relationship with the shadow economy, indicating that higher taxes lead to
more shadow economic activities. The effect of unemployment is also positive on the shadow
economy, indicating that a growing rate of unemployment leads to growing shadow economic
activities. Self-employment is only statistically significant determinant of the shadow economy
in the Czech Republic. It also has a positive relationship, indicating that the larger the growth of
self-employment activities, the higher the hidden economy. The results also show that the
burden of taxes on company profits causes a rise in shadow economic activities. Another
determinant unique to the case of Poland is the start-up procedures for registering a new
business. More complicated and bureaucratic procedures for business registration lead to higher
shadow economic activities.
The findings on GDP per capita are similar to the conclusions of Porta and Shleifer (2008),
who found that countries with higher productivity typically have a better allocation of resources
within the economy and so smaller informal sectors. This conclusion is also supported by the
findings of Herwartz et al. (2015) and Petersen et al. (2010). The findings on start-up procedures
for the registration of businesses are similar to the conclusions of Enste (2018) who concluded
that the shadow economies in Central and Eastern European countries are caused by incom-
petent regulatory institutions, weak regulations and bureaucratic business registration pro-
cedures. The conclusion of this study on the tax burden and the shadow economy are similar to
that of Tafenau et al. (2010) who showed that shadow economies are caused by the presence of
high tax burdens.
The conclusion of this study on the relationship between unemployment and the shadow
economy are similar to the findings of Davidescu et al. (2015) and Mauleon and Sarda (2017),
who concluded that higher levels of unemployment correlate with higher shares of shadow
economic activities. With regards to self-employment, this study concludes that more self-
employment activities indicate more shadow economic activities in all three countries. This is
supported by the findings of the ILO, (2014) as well.
The findings on the size of the shadows economies are similar to those of Medina and
Schneider (2018), who found the average shadow economy of the Czech Republic to be 14.1%,
Hungary, 22.4% and Poland 22.2%. They also found the shadow economies of other European
countries to be 8.93% in Austria, 29.17% in Bulgaria, and 30.14% in Romania. They estimated
the average size of the shadow economies of advanced countries to be 15.8%. Similarly, Hassan
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and Schneider (2016) studied shadow economies for advanced economies and found that the
average size is about 20.5% of official GDP.
With regards to tax evasion, the results are compared with the results of Nchor and Konderla
(2016) who estimated the tax loss due to shadow economic activities in the Czech Republic to be
7.2%. Similarly, Buehn and Schneider (2016) estimated the percentage of tax evasion from
shadow economic activities for 38 OECD countries and concluded that the average size of tax
evasion over the period 1999 to 2010 was 3.2% of official GDP. In their study, Mexico and
Turkey had the highest average values of about 6.8 and 6.7% respectively, while the United States
and Luxembourg had the lowest average tax evasion rates with 0.5 and 1.3%, respectively.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The study finds that the size of tax evasion by each country relates to the rate of self-
employment activities. For example, self-employment activities are higher in the Czech Republic
and Poland and that corresponds with higher tax evasion in both countries. Self-employment
also proves to be a statistically significant determinant of the shadow economy in the two
countries. It is therefore not out of place to focus attention on these activities. The study also
finds that the size of the tax loss is proportional to the size of the tax burden. Countries with
higher tax burdens experienced higher tax evasion. An example is Poland with a high rate of
value added tax and high rate of tax on incomes and profits. The study’s recommendation here
is that the tax burden should be reduced to rope in all business activities in the formal system.
Another key finding of this study is that difficult and bureaucratic business registration
procedures cause growth in shadow economic activities by pushing business owners to avoid
going through such procedures. The by-product of such cases is an unnecessary growth in the
size of the shadow economy. Registration procedures for businesses should be sanitised with
easy access to registration points and lower cost of registration. In more practical cases, a
conducive environment should be created for foreign business investors with regards to
personnel at the registration points. It is problematic if registration officials are not willing to
speak common languages that are understandable to business owners. Language barrier at
business registration points and tax administration offices should therefore be of paramount
interest to governments in their bid to minimize shadow economic activities.
For all countries, the rate of unemployment proves to be a statistically significant determi-
nant of the shadow economy. Unemployment exists in every country, but its impact on shadow
economic activities will largely depend on social policies that provide sources of living for the
unemployed. There is also the argument by some authors about the early retirement age, which
tends to render labour redundant, thus driving them into such activities. The recommendation is
to provide social safety nets for the growing numbers of unemployed. The retirement age should
also be increased to reduce the number of idle labour available to participate in the shadow
economy.
The limitation of the study is with regards to the MIMIC model. The model does not address
the illegal economy, hence it does not cover the whole magnitude of the unofficial economy.
However, other popular methods for the estimation of shadow economies do not seem to have
better alternatives to the measurement of the illegal economy either. Some key determinants of
shadow economic activities are not included in the study due to lack of data availability.
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Examples of such variables include data on corruption, business regulation and non-official
remittances.
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